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I Introduction
Delegated asset managers are commonly seen as being compensated through fees imposed
on outside investors. However, access to profitable, but limited, internal investment oppor-
tunities can also be a form of compensation for managers. Consider the hedge fund indus-
try, which manages over $3 trillion in assets under management, of which $400 billion can
be attributed to investments from insiders and related parties.1 This large allocation of in-
sider capital suggests that an important, and previously overlooked, component of hedge
fund compensation is the channel of returns on personally invested capital. This paper
examines the decision of insiders to allocate private capital to funds under their control,
and the impact of this “skin in the game” on returns received by outside investors.
The role of managerial discretion over internal capital allocation across funds can be
seen through the case of Renaissance Technologies.2 The company’s Medallion Fund is
one of the most successful funds in history and is predominately a fund for insider invest-
ment (as we confirm in Figure I). News accounts of Renaissance Technologies emphasize
how the company prioritizes strategies with greater excess returns and lower scalability
in the Medallion Fund, while shifting strategies with lower return profiles (for reasons of
scalability or staleness in execution) to other funds in the family characterized by greater
outside investor participation and lower fees. Discretion over private capital investment
can be seen in many fund families (as we show in Figure II), and has been the subject of
considerable investor and regulatory interest.3
This paper first proceeds by extending the Berk and Green (2004) framework to include
several key features which better capture institutional features of compensation structures
in hedge funds. In our model, managers face capacity constraints in determining the opti-
mal level of invested capital, can choose to endogenously create new funds with different
1For the size of the industry, see figures collected provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission:
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/im-private-fund-annual-report-081514.pdf
Inside investment is estimated using the inside ownership measure from Form ADV.
2See, for instance https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-21/
how-renaissance-s-medallion-fund-became-finance-s-blackest-box
3See Mary Jo White, SEC Chair on Oct. 16, 2015: "Examiners observed that some hedge fund advisers
may not be adequately disclosing conflicts related to advisers’ proprietary funds and the personal accounts of
their portfolio managers. Examiners saw, for example, advisers allocating profitable trades and investment
opportunities to proprietary funds rather than client accounts in contravention of existing policies and
procedures." Also see BlueCrest: https://www.ft.com/content/4eb275f2-a4dd-11e5-a91e-162b86790c58.
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strategies, and can allocate internal capital across funds. When managing personal capital,
managers internalize the fact that raising additional capital is dilutive to existing investors
in the sense that it causes the strategy to operate closer to its capacity constraint, lowering
the returns for all existing investors.
This basic framework yields several key predictions on the relationship between inside
investment and fund performance. We predict that when firms face a menu of investment
strategies with different excess return and scalability: 1) Inside investment will be concen-
trated in particular funds within a family; 2) Funds with a greater percentage of inside
investment are smaller, as they are further from their capacity constraint; and 3) Because
they are operated further from their capacity constraint, funds with greater inside capital
outperform on a risk-adjusted basis. Taken together, our model predicts that greater inside
investment better aligns incentives between managers and investors and induces managers
to limit the size of their fund, resulting in higher alphas even in equilibrium.
We study these predictions on the relationship between inside investment and fund re-
turns through a novel usage of a comprehensive and survivor-bias free dataset, Form ADV,
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This regulatory form requires
all hedge funds with assets over $100m to disclose the fraction of fund assets held by in-
siders yearly at the fund level. We merge Form ADV data with numerous commercially
available datasets on hedge fund returns to understand the connection between “skin in
the game” and fund returns.4
We first examine the importance and implications of investments by insiders through
an implementable long-only trading strategy. We generate sorted portfolios based on ob-
servable information on inside investment, rebalancing yearly, and track the performance
of investors who systematically invest in hedge funds with high levels of internal owner-
ship. We find this strategy results in sizable risk-adjusted excess returns over time relative
to a portfolio invested in low ownership funds.
Second, to further isolate the role of ownership on fund returns, we consider a panel
regression. Using both the Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) factors, as well
4Including HFR, CISDM, eVestment, BarclayHedge, and EurekaHedge.
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as the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, we control for factor exposure of returns at
the fund level. We find that inside investment—as measured either by percentage or gross
investment—remains an important predictor of excess returns even when comparing differ-
ent funds within firms. An investor who changes allocation from a fund with zero percent
inside investment to one at the same firm with 100 percent inside investment would see
a rise in excess returns of 36 basis points a month, or 4.3% annualized. This significant
and economically large magnitude indicates that inside investment is an important, and
previously neglected, cross-sectional predictor of hedge fund returns.
Third, having established the superior performance of insider investment funds, we
investigate the main drivers of this result by examining standard return predictability and
fund flow-performance specifications. We find that funds with little inside capital operate
according to standard Berk and Green (2004) logic: good returns are followed by large fund
inflows, so there is little predictability in excess returns. However, we find that funds with
greater inside investment do not follow this pattern. For this subset of funds, high returns
do not lead to excess inflows; instead excess returns are persistent. The joint behavior
between fund flows, performance, and inside investment suggests that capacity constraints
are an important driver of hedge fund performance; and that managers of hedge funds
choose to deploy less capital (and so gain greater alpha) when their own personal capital
is involved.
Next, we examine the heterogeneity across funds. Consistent with the role of man-
agerial discretion over capacity constraints, our results are driven by funds engaged in
specialist roles, arbitrage strategies, and equity funds which might be expected to deploy
trading strategies subject to diminishing returns to scale. We also investigate alternate
explanations for our result, such as superior information on the part of fund managers,
agency conflicts, front-running, and lower susceptibility to redemption risk. Our tests sug-
gest that these alternate factors are unlikely to fully explain our result. While we cannot
fully rule out the relationship between inside investment and other fund attributes, under-
standing inside investment through the lens of fund capacity constraints appears to best
explain our results.
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Finally, we investigate whether insiders are able to "cream skim" outside investors
through fund formation and strategic capital allocation. Specifically, we use an event study
framework to analyze firms which begin as a single-fund firm and create a new fund. This
transition is illustrated in Figure III. The generation of a second fund provides a test case
to analyze the effects of inside investment on fund performance, because insiders have a
discretionary choice on private capital allocation: 1) Keep their money in the old fund, and
invite outsiders to invest in the new fund; or 2) Move internal capital into the new fund.
The two cases have differing predictions on the performance level of the initial fund: when
inside capital remains in the original fund, we expect the original fund to outperform; rel-
ative to when insiders move their capital out of the newly formed fund. We find evidence
consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting the possibility of "skimming" motives on the
part of fund managers.
Our results come with several caveats which we emphasize here. Though we establish
inside ownership as an important predictor of excess returns and highlight the role for
capacity constraints in understanding this result from a theoretical and empirical perspec-
tive; it is possible that other mechanisms operate in addition to the ones we emphasize. It
is possible that inside investors are better informed about the skill of various fund man-
agers and deploy capital accordingly; alternatively, high skin-in-the-game funds may be
less subject to agency conflicts and engage in superior research analysis. Inside investment
may also serve as a signal to outside investors by providing costly evidence of managerial
commitment. Finally, it is possible that higher returns from high-skin-in-the-game funds is
a proxy for some risk factor (unrelated to either the Fama-French, Carhart, or Fung-Hsieh
factors). While more research is needed to establish the precise reasons for the outper-
formance of high inside investment firms, we emphasize that our work provides novel
evidence that ownership is an important predictor of cross-sectional fund performance in
ways consistent with a basic model including capacity constraints and inside investment.
Our work connects to several lines of research. First, we contribute to the broader lit-
erature on financial compensation and incentives, such as Das and Sundaram (2002), Ibert
et al. (2017), and Ma, Tang and Gomez (2016). While previous work has studies the role
of managerial contract structures on hedge fund performance (such as Agarwal, Daniel
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and Naik (2009) and Burasachi, Kosowski and Sritrakul (2014)), we emphasize that man-
agers have another option for personal compensation: investing their own private capital.
Access to superior investable opportunities helps explain why financial intermediaries—
particularly hedge funds—appear to be so highly compensated even in the face of stiff
compensation. In turn, our findings are relevant in understanding the recent rise in in-
equality among the top 1%, who are disproportionately financial managers of capital (See
Kaplan and Raugh (2013), Philippon and Reshef (2012), and Alvaredo et al. (2013)).
Our work also relates to the broader literature on assessing managerial ability among
delegated asset managers. We connect to a part of this literature which analyzes manage-
rial alpha from the perspective of tests of the efficient market hypothesis. In the recent
literature, Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010), Koijen (2014), and Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) assess the distribution of managerial alpha. The papers closest to
ours among mutual funds are Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007), Evans (2008), Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang (2008), and Cremers et al. (2009), which analyze insider investments
by mutual fund managers.
Our work also relates to research examining the role of fund families. Related papers
include Massa (2003), which documents strategy differentiation across funds in a family;
Berk, van Binsbergen and Liu (2017), which examines the allocation of talent across funds
within a family; and Sialm and Tham (2017), which analyzes relationship between the
performance of funds and their overall management companies. Our model and analysis
of managerial skill is also related to the equilibrium modeling approach of Berk and Green
(2004), and Berk and van Binsbergen (2017), as well as evidence on capacity constraints as
in Ramadorai (2013).
Finally, our work also contributes to the broader literature on ownership, firm perfor-
mance, and agency conflicts. Starting with Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Holmstrom (1985); this literature has analyzed the con-
sequences of firm capital structure on governance and agency conflicts. Related empirical
work includes Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Randall, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Himmelberg,
Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Porta et al. (2002). Our work extends this literature by
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emphasizing the conflict between managers and investors regarding the internal capital
structure and fund formation decisions of hedge funds in the presence of capacity con-
straints. Decisions of funds to open up additional funding to outside capital (in order to
earn management fees) have material consequences on the returns of existing investors.
We find, both in our model and in the data, that firms extract considerable surplus through
the allocation of internal capital to funds which do not hit their capacity constraint, repre-
senting a potential conflict of interest between hedge fund managers and investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our data and
empirical strategy, and also comments briefly on the nature of corporate governance in
hedge funds. Section 3 presents our main results, while Section 4 concludes. The Appendix
contains further details on our model and auxiliary results.
II Data and Empirical Strategy
II.A Data
Our dataset combines regulatory ADV filings with commercial hedge fund return series
from HFR, eVestment, BarclaysHedge, Eurekahedge, and CISDM. Form ADV is a required
regulatory disclosure form used to register with both the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and state securities authorities. Reporting under Form ADV is governed by
the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended by Dodd-Frank. Disclosure require-
ments under this form have changed over the years. In the period from 1996–2011, funds
with assets under management below $25 million, or fewer than 15 clients, were been gen-
erally exempt from registration. Hedge funds in this period frequently used complex fund
structures to evade disclosure in this period even when assets were above this threshold.
Private fund reporting increased in 2005, when the SEC went to court to force funds to
count all investors as clients. Though courts ultimately struck down the SEC’s interpreta-
tion, disclosure through Form ADV increased throughout this period. Our primary sample
is formed after 2011, after changes in required disclosure imposed by Dodd-Frank. Under
prevailing regulations, all investment advisors—including hedge funds—are now required
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to file a Form ADV with the SEC if they 1) Reach a $100 million threshold for assets un-
der management for a typical fund, 2) Reach a $150 million threshold if the firm has only
private clients; or 3) Have over $25 million in assets and are not subject to examination in
their home states (states which do not require examination currently include New York and
Wyoming). Subsequent to their initial filing, firms must refile once a year (as long as their
assets under management exceed $25 million), or if there have been changes in material
information since the last filing.
We obtain Form ADV from the SEC over the period 2011–2016. We link Form ADV
information together with information on hedge fund returns obtained from a combina-
tion of five datasets: HFR, eVestment, Barclays, Eureka Hedge, and CISDM. We begin the
merge with HFR, eVestment and Barclays, which contain for many firms an SEC identifier
common to both the commercial hedge fund datasets and Form ADV. If we do not have an
SEC identifier, we next look for close matches (selecting only perfect matches) among firm
and fund names in both datasets, after eliminating extraneous stop words (such as LLC,
LP, etc.).
Over this period, Form ADV was updated with questions about the internal investment
of their funds. Figure IV shows a sample Form ADV for Renaissance Technologies.5 Panel
A captures firm level information for the filing firm, Renaissance Technologies LLC. Panel
B identifies a specific fund as listed in section 7.B.(1), in this case Medallion Fund, L.P.
Panel C of IV displays the precise question we draw on from Section 7.B.(1), question 14
of Form ADV: “What is the approximate percentage of the private fund beneficially owned
by you and your related persons.” This question asks the ultimate ownership of investment
stakes in the fund which can be attributed to "related persons,” which we treat as internal
investment for the remainder of the paper.
Summary Table I shows basic summary information about both our core Form ADV
dataset, as well as the merged subset. Figure V demonstrates our merge rate across the
range of firm ownership. We find that funds with complete inside investment (100 percent)
and no inside investment (0 percent) exhibit worse merge rates into our ADV dataset.
5Form ADV publicly available through the SEC’s website, https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/
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These funds also pose additional identification questions—either outsiders cannot invest,
or insiders have chosen not to invest in these funds. For these reasons, we focus in the
remainder of our analysis on funds in the interior of the internal investment distribution:
between one and 99 percent inside investment, inclusive.
A breakdown of “related parties” is provided in Table II, which illustrates all possi-
ble responses for which parties constitute related parties. The most common response is
“Sponsor of GP,”6 suggesting that the definition of related party most often corresponds to
a vehicle used by the actual managers of the fund. Alternately, related parties can include
other closely related entities, such as asset investment by a broker/dealer. A separate set
of questions asks the legal name of all related parties: these are typically closely related
entities to the management company, share a supervised person almost three quarters of
the time, and over half of the time share a common physical office. Despite the limitations
of this measure in exactly calculating managerial stakes, we document that related parties
are typically vehicles for fund investment by the General Partners, and typically represent
asset management on the behalf of closely related entities that can be considered “inside
capital.”
Panel B of Figure I illustrates the density of fund responses across different fund vehi-
cles for our example of Renaissance Technologies, and demonstrating a clear dispersion of
fractional inside investment across different funds within the firm family. Figure II illus-
trates other sample inside investment distributions across funds for selected well-known
hedge funds. The common pattern is one in which hedge funds operate a variety of ve-
hicles with varying degrees of inside investment. The dispersion of inside investment is
consistent with our model (see Appendix A), which predicts that insiders do not deploy
capital evenly across funds within their family, but instead preferentially allocate inside
capital in certain funds as a function of the excess return and scalability of investment
strategies.
Panel A of Figure VI illustrates the density of responses on inside investment across
our full merged dataset. Panel B of Figure VI shows the distribution of assets under man-
agement attributable to inside investment, shown on a log dollar scale.
6We verify that results hold when we subset on firms for which this is true.
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II.B Conflicts and Disclosure
Hedge fund operating agreements demand few fiduciary obligations to managers to
prioritize one fund over another, or prioritize funds with their own internal capital on the
same basis as funds with a greater preponderance of outside capital. As noted in Nowak
(2009) and quoted in Morley (2014), the manager:
is required to devote to the [fund] only that amount of time and attention
that the [manager] in its sole discretion deems reasonably necessary to achieve
the [fund’s] objectives.
Discretion is typically left in the hands of the manager to handle any conflicts of interest
across classes of investors, different funds in a family, or in accepting additional outside
capital. Corporate governance within hedge funds is deliberately minimal due to strong
exit rights among investors, and typical limitations on investment to classes of accredited
or well-informed investors.
II.C Empirical Strategy
II.C.1 Main Specification
Our model, (see Appendix A), yields sharp predictions on the relationship between
inside investment and fund returns and size, which we examine the returns on portfolios
invested in baskets of hedge funds. The starting point of our analysis is the investing
decisions of an institutional investor interested in allocating across the broad investable
universe of fund managers.
rit − r f t = αiT + β1,iTRMRFt + β2,iTSMBt + β3,iTHMLt + ε it (1)
Where i = 1, . . . , 5 different portfolios sorted along quartiles of internal investment,
t = 2012− 2016 monthly, and rit represents returns net-fees of the different portfolios (with
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the risk free return differenced out to produce the risky return). We also consider factor-
correction using the set of seven factors as described in Fung and Hsieh (2004):7
rit − r f t = αiT + β1,iTS&Pt + β2,iTSC− LCt + β3,iT10Yt + β4,iTCredSprt + β5,iTBdOptt
+ β6,tFXOptt + β7,tComOpt + ε it
(2)
Next, we turn to a fund-based approach and estimate the impact of ownership on
returns on a fund-by-fund level, adjusting for factor exposure:
rit − r f t = αiT + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,iTRMRFt + βˆ2,iTSMBt + βˆ3,iTHMLt + ε it (3)
Where we examine ownership as proxied by both the percentage of the fund which
consists of insider investment; as well as the gross insider exposure. We value-weight this
regression by assets under management to better proxy the portfolio allocation decision of
an institutional investor. They key variable of interest is γ, which captures the predictive
role of greater inside investment on excess returns.
We are particularly interested in this analysis using firm and year fixed effects.
rit − r f t = αiT + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,iTRMRFt + βˆ2,iTSMBt + βˆ3,iTHMLt + δFIRMi + ηYeart + ε it
(4)
This allows us to control for other year and firm factors driving excess return. The
interpretation of γ in this case is the amount of excess return attributed to investing in a
high-skin fund relative to a low-skin fund within the same company and year.
In addition to the above factor model, we also use Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model:
rit − r f t = αiT + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,iTS&Pt + βˆ2,iTSC− LCt + βˆ3,iT10Yt
+ βˆ4,iTCredSprt + βˆ5,iTBdOptt + βˆ6,tFXOptt + βˆ7,tComOpt + ε it
7This factor model has been widely used in previous empirical research on hedge fund returns and have
been shown to have considerable explanatory power. The trend following factors can be found at:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls
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The interpretation of γ in this equation is similar, and allows us to examine the role of
additional "skin-in-the-game" on fund performance.
Finally, to test for size, we perform a comparable analysis regressing the assets under
management of funds against the fraction of inside investment:
AUMit = ψOwnershipit + δFIRMi + ηYeart + ε it (5)
The ψ coefficient here captures the relationship of size and fractional inside investment,
within firm and year.
II.C.2 Fund-Flow Sensitivity and Return Predictability
Following prior literature, such as Chevalier and Ellison (1997), we define fund flows
using net flows ri,t as:
FLOWit =
AUMit − (1 + ri,t) · AUMi,t−1
AUMi,t−1
(6)
Using this definition, we also test standard fund-flow sensitivities:
FLOWi,t→t+1 = β(1 + rei,t−1→t) + ε i,t (7)
The coefficient of interest, β, captures the sensitivity of fund flows to excess returns (in-
corporating a factor adjustment), avoiding chronological overlap. We also examine return
predictability:
rei,t→t+1 = βr
e
i,t−1→t + ε i,t (8)
We next turn to our main results testing the relationships outlined in this section.
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III Results
III.A Graphical Results
To illustrate our basic result, we first show the relationship between the non-parametric
relationship between inside ownership and raw returns. Figure VII illustrates the outcome
of an trading strategy implementable in real-time that sorts funds into quartiles each year
based on inside investment. The high ownership quantile consists of an equal-weighted
investment in all funds in the high-ownership bucket; with yearly balancing each year as
new ADV data becomes publicly available. The figure illustrates that the high ownership
category outperforms fund portfolios with less skin in the game over our sample period
from 2012–2016.
III.B Regression Results
Next, we turn to regressions which control more closely for fund factor exposure. Our
model suggests that, within a firm; funds with a greater proportion of inside capital will
outperform because managers internalize the capacity constraints of the investment strat-
egy when accepting new capital. Funds with greater inside capital retain greater alpha,
in equilibrium, because managers maximize profits by not accepting additional outside
capital to the capacity limit of the investing strategy.
To bring this model to the data, we examine the portfolio returns in the previous section
and control for factor exposure at the level of the sorted portfolio. Table III illustrates
this regression using the Fama and French (1992) 3-Factors as well as the Carhart (1997)
momentum factor. In this specification, we examine the amount of monthly excess return
of value-weighted portfolios sorted along the dimension of inside investment rebalanced
yearly. We observe that the superior performance of the high-inside investment portfolio
persists under factor correction. We find greater statistical significance in Table IV which
uses the Fung and Hsieh (2004) series of seven hedge fund factors. In this table, we find that
the fund portfolio in the highest quartile of inside investment has a statistically significant
excess performance of 62 basis points a month, relative to an excess performance of 40 basis
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points for the portfolio with least inside investment. Results follow a pattern of increasing
alpha and sharpe ratios with the degree of inside investment in-between.
To further analyze the role of inside investment and risk-adjusted returns, we examine
in Table V fund-level regressions as outlined in our Empirical Strategy Section above. In
Panel A, we focus on the standard four-factor model to correct for factor exposure and
regress excess returns against measures of inside investment. Column 1 of this table re-
gresses the percent of a fund’s assets under management which can be attributed to insider
investment against excess returns. Inside investment is statistically associated with excess
returns even unconditionally. This relationship persists in our preferred specification in
column 2, which controls for year and firm effects. Our estimates in that column suggest
that a fund at 100 percent skin in the game exhibits a 36 basis point higher excess monthly
return relative to a fund with no internal investment, or 4.3% higher excess returns a year.
These results are quite large quantitatively, and suggest a strong importance for internal
investment as a predictor of cross-sectional fund performance. The larger magnitude and
significance of results when controlling for firm fixed effects suggests the importance of
discretionary fund allocation by insiders: there is high dispersion of fund returns within
firms in our sample, and insiders choose which investment strategies to pursue in which
funds, and which funds to invest in. Our results suggest that their private capital is more
likely deployed in funds which outperform others within the family.
We find similar results in columns 3 and 4, which examine the gross amount of inside
investment, rather than the fractional amount. We also find substantially larger estimates
in Panel B, which uses the Fung and Hsieh (2004) measure of hedge fund returns. In
this specification, we find that inside investment is associated with internal investment (as
measured on a percentage or gross level) unconditionally, as well as in conjunction with
fund and firm results. Our results in these specifications are larger in magnitude, and
suggest that a fund with 100 percent skin in the game can expect 56 basis points higher in
excess return, monthly, relative to a fund with zero percent inside investment.
Following prior literature, we present main results value-weighted in order to better
match the composition of the investable universe and mirror the decision of an outside
14
investor. All results in Table V are value-weighted using the Gross Asset Value field in
Form ADV, which is present for all funds. Table VI presents equally-weighted results,
which yields very similar results.8
These results are subject to several important caveats. First, while these results suggest
that fund-level inside investment predicts superior excess returns, the relationship might
not be causal. It may well be that our measure of inside skin in the game is a proxy for other
fund level characteristics. Another important caveat is that we are not able to fully control
for whether our results are driven by some element of risk or are instead due to agency
conflicts within the firm. Despite our attempts to control for risk using the benchmark
fund factors, it is also possible that the outperformance of high skin-in-the-game funds is
due to a novel risk factor. To further analyze the mechanisms driving our main result, we
examine fund decisions along other dimensions.
III.C Main Mechanism: Capacity Constraints
Having established that investment by insiders predict fund outperformance, we next
consider the possible drivers of this relationship. In order to investigate the source of
relative out-performance of high investment funds, we are guided by our model (discussed
in Appendix A), which yields key predictions on the mechanisms behind inside investment
and fund performance.
First, we consider how lagged excess returns relate to asset flows to funds. Figure VIII
plots a non-parametric relationship between lagged returns and fund inflows, by funds
with a greater or lesser degree of insider investment. Insider funds are defined as those
with a greater than average (> 20 percent) amount of fraction of fund assets attributable to
insiders.
The figure illustrates that outsider funds exhibit standard a fund flow-performance
relationship as documented in prior research on hedge funds and mutual funds. However,
insider funds demonstrate a very different profile: insider funds which experience positive
8Results are also similar when weighting by AUM as measured using the commercial hedge fund datasets.
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excess returns do not exhibit subsequent high inflows, consistent with the idea that funds
with greater insider capital manage funds further away from their capacity constraint.
Complementing the results on flow performance, Figure IX plots a non-parametric rela-
tionship between excess returns over time. Outsider funds demonstrate low return return
predictability: high excess returns are followed by lower returns in the subsequent pe-
riod, consistent with the standard Berk and Green (2004) logic that high returns encourage
fund inflows, driving down returns in future period. Insider funds, however, exhibit high
persistent returns over time: high excess returns are followed by high returns over time.
Table VII illustrates the flow performance and return predictability specifications, as
outlined in equations 7 and 8. The independent variable in these specifications is the same
(lagged excess returns); the dependent variable is is either fund flows or subsequent excess
returns.
The regression results confirm the graphical evidence that insider funds exhibit novel
flow and performance behavior: high insider ownership funds do not experience additional
inflows in response to high excess returns; and in parallel experience greater persistence in
excess returns.
The joint relationship between inside investment, flow performance, and return pre-
dictability provides strong evidence that the ability of fund insiders to manage capacity
constraints helps account for their outperformance. By limiting fund inflows in periods in
which funds experience high returns, insider funds are able to maintain persistently high
excess returns over time. In doing so, funds are foregoing management fees on additional
capital in lieu of greater excess returns on privately invested capital.
III.D Robustness
III.D.1 Heterogenous Treatment Effects
Figure XI illustrates the main effect (as in column (2) of Table V) by fund categories.
Panel A of this figure plots the coefficient of inside investment against excess return by
categories as measured in our set of commercial hedge fund datasets. The main effects are
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driven by funds which engage in specialist absolute return strategies, arbitrage strategies,
and equity funds. Within equity funds (Panel B), effects are driven by long-short funds and
those focused on emerging markets. These fund strategies more plausibly feature capacity
constraints in their investment strategies. By contrast, effects are insignificant among fund
of funds and CTAs, which feature trend-following strategies with less role for managerial
skill.
III.D.2 Fund Size
We also analyze the role of size and inside investment. Again, we hypothesize in our
model that a key mechanism driving the superior performance of insider funds is their
smaller size, due to decreasing returns to scale in investment technologies. To test this
hypothesis, in Table VIII, we regress the size of the fund against a measure of proportional
inside investment. In column (2) of Panel A, we focus on our matched dataset and find that
an additional percent of inside investment is associated with a $14 million smaller fund.
This relationship persists when we examine a specification where the dependent variable
is the log of assets under management in column 4.
We are also able to run this specification on the Form ADV dataset only, in Panel B.
These specifications use the field “Gross Asset Value” derived from fund-level information
in Form ADV. Gross asset value differs from assets under management in that it does not
subtract out the value of short positions from the portfolio, and so overestimates true firm
size. Despite the limitations of this measure, using this field as a dependent variable en-
able us to avoid losing observations on the merge between our Form ADV dataset and the
commercial hedge fund datasets. Results are very similar when not restricting on funds
which merge into commercial hedge fund datasets: we find in column (2) that within a
firm, funds with an additional percent of inside investment are around $19 million smaller
in gross asset value. These results provide additional support for the model: inside in-
vestment funds are both smaller and outperform; suggesting that managers do not hit the
limits of the capacity constraints of their investment strategy when their own private capi-
tal is deployed. The reluctance to accept additional outside capital on these funds explains
why they continue to outperform and gain excess returns, even in equilibrium.
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III.E Superior Manger Information
An alternate and complementary mechanism in explaining our main result that greater
insider investment predicts higher excess returns is that managers have superior private
information on the abilities of fund managers than outside investors, and so deploy per-
sonal capital to the superior managers. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following
specification in Table IX:
rei,t−1→t = βInsiderIn f lowi,t−1 + γOutsiderIn f lowi,t−1 + ε it (9)
This specification tests whether changes in insider investment predict excess returns.
We find that changes in neither inside nor outside flows predict excess returns. While this
test is not fully conclusive regarding the channel of superior inside information, this result
suggests that insiders do not appear to be able to time their capital allocation decisions
in ways that future excess returns. Put differently: levels of inside investment, rather
than changes, predict future returns. In conjunction with the results on fund flows and
performance, this result is perhaps unsurprising: fund insiders appear to frequently extract
funds from their best performing funds, rather than further invest, in order to continue
operate funds further from their capacity constraint and gain excess returns.
III.F Event Study
The results from the previous section provide suggestive evidence of a role for insider
investment in driving fund returns, and suggest that the possibility of insider investment
should be seen as a critical component of the compensation of managers in addition to
management and incentive fees. They raise the prospect that fund managers may seek to
further take advantage of this relationship by further steering clients into lower performing
funds (in our model, to the point that their participation constraint is binding, and they
earn no additional returns beyond a passive benchmark).
We explore this possibility in Figure X, which conducts an event study in the aftermath
of the creation of a new fund among firms which previously only had one. The creation
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of an additional fund presents two possibilities for fund managers: they can either keep
their internal capital invested in the original fund (using the new fund to instead attract
new capital); or they can shift their own capital to the new fund (and market the original
fund to investors). If the amount of insider capital is an important determinant of fund
performance, we expect different fund performance in the original fund under the two
cases. If managers are shifting their capital outside of the fund, we expect the performance
of the original fund to deteriorate (since managers are no longer as invested in success
of the fund). If, on the other hand, managers keep their capital in the original fund: the
performance of the original fund should remain strong.
To test this possibility, we focus on all cases in which a hedge fund, which previously
only operated one fund, opens a second. We isolate two cases: one in which the new fund
has less internal investment than the original (the new fund has “low skin”), and another
in which the new fund has more internal investment than the original. We plot cumulative
returns of the fund for the two year window both before and after the fund creation date.
Our results suggest that fund performance is relatively similar before the event date
for the original fund, regardless of whether the firm subsequently creates a new fund with
high or low internal investment. Differences grow more pronounced in the aftermath of
fund creation. We find that when the new fund has “low skin”—suggesting that managers
keep their internal capital in the original fund—fund performance suffers; relative to what
happens when the newly create fund has “high skin.” We expect to see this difference
because managers are more invested in the success of the initial fund if their capital remains
deployed in the fund. If their own capital has moved to a different fund, performance tends
to suffer in the window after fund creation.
Though these results are not fully conclusive, they are suggestive of the possibility of
“skimming” motives on the part of fund managers. If managers are able to shift their
internal investments across funds within the same family, they seem able to focus their
investments on successful funds, while steering outside capital into the less performing
funds. These results therefore provide additional context to our model and previous em-
pirical results, in suggesting that active decisions made by fund managers regarding fund
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creation and where capital is deployed play a role in determining returns for outside in-
vestors.
To be clear, this analysis does not distinguish whether that is due to insiders having
better information on which fund managers can outperform relative to outsiders; or be-
cause managers devote more effort when greater amounts of personal capital are on the
line. Despite the multiple possible explanations, we emphasize that our result provides
novel evidence on the role of inside investment in shaping fund performance as new funds
are created.
III.G Firm-Level Equity
In addition to the choice of investing personal capital in the fund alongside outside
investors, managers also have the option of investing in equity at the firm level. Analysis
of the ownership structure of the partnerships that comprise typical hedge funds has been
limited due to scarce data. In this section, we use Form ADV data to shed light on the
ownership structures of hedge funds.
Figure XII illustrates the imputation process for firm-level equity. We use fractional
ownership codes, found on Schedules A and B of Form ADV. These ownership fields track
both direct and indirect owners, allowing us to examine the ultimate beneficial owners
of hedge fund structures, even when shielded behind shell structures such as LLCs. A
limitation of our analysis is that ownership codes are fractionally allocated (i.e., ownership
fields will track an owner with a stake between 10%-25% of the firm’s equity. We tabulate
for this reason a minimum and maximum estimate of the firm’s equity, illustrated in Panel
A of Figure XII.
Panel B of this figure plots a histogram of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) mea-
sure of dispersion in firm-level ownership. Many hedge funds feature no dispersion in
ownership (are beneficially owned by only one individual or entity); however many firms
have fractional ownership.
In order to investigate the implications of dispersion in firm-level ownership, and its
relation with fund-level inside investments, we regress both measures in conjunction in
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Table X. Column (3) of this table suggests that inside investment at the fund level remains
a significant predictor of excess returns, even when controlling for measures of firm-level
ownership. In addition to fund-level inside investment, we find that the number of equity
owners (as a measure of the dispersion in a hedge fund family’s ownership structure)
negatively predicts excess returns. While this result would be consistent with the idea that
dispersion in a firm’s equity structure is a sign of agency frictions and internal firm conflict,
other explanations might also potentially explain the relationship between dispersion in
firm-level equity dispersion and fund performance. Despite the limitations of our measures
of firm-level equity, we emphasize that our paper is the first to our knowledge to examine
measures of insider capital allocations for a comprehensive sample of hedge funds both at
the levels of fund allocation, as well as firm-level equity contributions.
IV Conclusions
The ability to access and allocate capital to profitable, but highly limited, investment
opportunities within the companies they oversee is a substantial element of fund manager
compensation. However, this has been rarely been explored in empirical and theoretical
analysis of delegated asset management. We explore how the possibility of inside invest-
ment alters fund performance in the context of an equilibrium model along the lines of Berk
and Green (2004). Our model highlights the tradeoff between management fees earned by
managing funds close to their capacity constraint, and earning excess returns on private
capital invested in strategies further from capacity constraint; as well as the role of in-
side investments in better aligning incentives between managers and investors. Our model
yields clear predictions on the role of inside investment and fund performance: we predict
that when intermediary firms have access to a variety of different strategies which vary
along the dimensions of excess return and scalability, managers will differentially allocate
private capital across funds at their disposal to maximize private returns. The model pre-
dicts that we should find a dispersion of inside investment across funds, and that greater
inside investment should predict excess returns and smaller fund size.
We take these predictions to the data using a comprehensive and survivor-bias free
dataset of hedge fund characteristics taken from Form ADV. We document novel patterns
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of inside investment in hedge funds by related parties, which typically include sponsors of
the general partners and closely related entities, and find confirmation of our hypothesis
that firms—including several prominent hedge funds—typically operate a variety of funds
with varying degrees of internal investment.
To better understand the relationship between inside investment and returns, we begin
with an implementable hedge fund investment strategy which selects high inside invest-
ment funds. We find this strategy outperforms a portfolio invested in funds with low
insider allocations. We further analyze the role of inside ownership by regressing ex-
cess returns (controlling for the Fama-French factors and the Carhart factor, as well as the
Fung-Hsieh seven factors) against measures of ownership. We find that funds with higher
internal investment have greater excess returns, even when we control for firm fixed effects
and so compare funds within the same family. Our results are large in magnitude, sug-
gesting that a fund with purely internal investment rather than purely outsider investment
will outperform at a rate of around 36 basis points a month.
We find that high inside investment funds have both different fund flow-performance
and return predictability characteristics compared with funds largely catering to outside
investors. In response to positive excess returns, they do not accept as much inflows of
capital as do outsider funds, and in tandem experience greater persistence of high excess
returns. The joint relationship between internal investment, fund flows, and performance
suggests that funds better manage capacity constraints when managers have personal cap-
ital at stake, leading to superior performance. This finding is consistent with our model
explanation that insider funds operate at a smaller scale because managers internalize the
costs of fund expansion.
We also find suggestive evidence that fund managers are able to strategically deploy
fund creation and private capital allocation to further “skim” investors. We document that
firm performance improves when a newly created fund contains largely outsider capital
but inside capital remains in the fund; relative to when insider investments shift to newly
created funds. Overall, we find that funds which rely more on insider money outperform
funds which do not “eat their own cooking.”
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These results, taken as a whole, provide powerful support for our hypothesis that
hedge funds face capacity constraints in their operations, and differentially allocate capital
across their funds to maximize profits, depending on the mix of inside and outside capital.
Our results suggest that the capital structure of hedge funds has a substantial impact on
operating performance. When funds rely on outside capital, managers are compensated
primarily from managerial fees and leave little value to outside investors. Greater reliance
on internal financing better aligns incentives of managers and outside investors, leading
them to leave substantial “slack” in fund size and operate strategies on a lower scale,
thereby receiving excess returns, even in a competitive equilibrium.
Our results contribute to ongoing debates regarding the presence of managerial alpha
and financial rents. Many observers are puzzled at the apparently outsize rents earned
by financial intermediaries such as hedge funds, even in the wake of apparently strong
competition and the role of fund inflows on diminishing returns. In turn, these managerial
rents have driven top-end wealth and income inequality (see Kaplan and Raugh (2013)).
We suggest a possible reconciliation of these facts can be found in examining the option
that fund managers have of not only of earning management and performance fees, but
also of deploying their own capital in funds they manage.
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FIGURE I Anecdotal Evidence, Relating Performance to Insider Investment
This figure highlights the performance and heterogeneity of insider ownership. Panel A shows a Bloomberg ar-
ticle from November 21, 2016 discussing Renaissance Technologies’ highly successful insider fund, the Medal-
lion Fund. Panel B is a histogram of percent insider capital across all funds (> $100m) within Renaissance
Technologies from Form ADV showing the heterogeneity of insider investment.
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FIGURE II Heterogeneity of Insider Investment Across Numerous Funds
This figure shows the heterogeneity of insider investment for a set of sample firms. The horizontal
axis corresponds to the percent of insider investment and the vertical axis corresponds to the count
of funds. The histograms correspond to 2016 ADV filings, and excluded any funds less than $100
million.
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Panel A: One Firm, One Fund (1F1F)
Panel B: Different Insider Investment, Within Firm
Panel C: Event Study Analysis
FIGURE III Firm and Fund Analysis
This figure outlines the difference between firm and fund in the context of this paper and emphasizes the
different setups we analyze. Panel A describes a one firm one fund (1F1F) structure and the comparison of
incentives between two hypothetical firms. Panel B describes a firm with two separate funds with different
insider capital. Our within firm analysis compares Fund 1 against Fund 2, within firm. Panel C shows the
time evolution of Firm A, transitioning from a one fund to multi-fund firm.
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Panel A: Section 1, Form ADV
Panel B: Section 7.B.(1), Fund Identity, Form ADV
Panel C: Section 7.B.(1), Ownership Reporting, Form ADV
FIGURE IV Sample Form ADV — Renaissance Technologies
This figure shows three excerpts from the SEC’s Form ADV for a sample firm, Renaissance Technologies LLC.
Panel A shows basic information to identify firms. Panel B shows basic fund information for our sample
fund, Medallion Fund L.P., and is found in section 7.B.(1). Panel C shows ownership data such as minimum
investment, number of investors, and basic composition of investors, and is reported at the fund level. We rely
primarily on question 14, at the fund level, when studying insider ownership. Form ADVs can be searched at
https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/
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FIGURE V Bias Analysis of Merged Sample
This figure plots the merge rate between the insider investment observations from Form ADV and
the hedge fund commercial return databases (outlined in the Data section). It is generated by
dividing the empirical distribution of the merged sample against the unmerged sample of funds.
The red, dotted line, highlights the unbiased boundary. Larger than one indicates a higher match
rate relative to the average match rate. Observations for 0% and 100% inside investment have been
omitted to be consistent with the analysis. See Appendix for further bias analysis.
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FIGURE VI Distribution of Insider Investment from Merge Sample
This figure plots the insider investment into hedge funds from the merged sample of hedge fund
returns and ADV forms. Panel A is a histogram of insider investment, and is in units of percent
of total investment. This displays the “dumbbell" insider investment pattern common across fund
types. Panel B is a histogram of log(NAV) of insider investment for the merged sample.
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FIGURE VII Return on Trading Strategy Buying Inside Investment Sorted Portfolios
This figure plots the net cumulative returns to portfolios formed on a quartile sort of percent insider
invested. Cut 1 corresponds to funds in the lowest quartile of inside investment; Cut 5 corresponds
to funds in the highest quartile of investment. Returns reflect the value-weighted performance of
baskets of funds within these ownership buckets, rebalanced annually.
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FIGURE VIII Flow Performance of Funds by Insider Status
This figure plots a kernel density of the relationship between lagged excess return and contempo-
raneous flow. The flow measure is defined as: FLOWit =
AUMit−(1+ri,t)·AUMi,t−1
AUMi,t−1 . Excess returns are
defined using the Fama-French 4 factors. Funds are divided by the average level of inside invest-
ment into insider funds (> 20% Inside Investment) and outsider funds. Grey bars correspond to
95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE IX Return Predictability Funds by Insider Status
This figure plots a kernel density between lagged and contemporaneous excess return. Excess
returns are defined using the Fama-French 4 factors. Funds are divided by the average level of
inside investment into insider funds (> 20% Inside Investment) and outsider funds. Grey bars
correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE X Event Study, Transition From One Fund to Multiple Funds
This figure plots the net cumulative returns of a firm transitioning from having one fund to mul-
tiple funds. The event time corresponds to the creation of the new fund, with time zero as the
month a new fund is created. The lines corresponds to the cumulative performance of the original
fund. After time zero, the high insider investment fund is flagged and tracked. The red solid line
corresponds to the original fund that has the highest percent of insider investment. In contrast, the
blue dotted line corresponds to the original fund that does not have the highest percent of insider
investment.
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FIGURE XI Main Effects by Fund Type
This figure illustrates the main specification, as shown in Column (2) of Table V, broken out by fund
category. Funds are categorized based on descriptions in commercial hedge fund datasets listed in
the Data section.
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FIGURE XII Firm-Level Equity Ownership
This figure illustrates the firm-level equity ownershiop estimates of all hedge funds in the Form
ADV data. ?? presents both minimum and maximum estimate of aggregate equity ownership
of hedge funds from recursively linking Schedule A B. ?? presents the concentration of equity
ownership at the firm-level and described by the HHI of ownership.
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TABLE I This table illustrates basic aggregate summary statistics for the entire ADV sample in 2015,
as well as the subsample which matches with commercial hedge fund datasets (Eureka Hedge,
Barclays, and CISDM).
Total Merged Sample
Total Gross Asset Value 6, 013 236
Number of Employees 2, 524, 566 26, 091
Non-Advisory Employees 1, 699, 510 15, 669
Advisory Employees 825, 056 10, 422
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TABLE II This table illustrates the identity of related parties. The rows need not sum to one: firms
select as many options apply to identify all related parties.
Statistic Mean SD
Sponsor of GP 0.727 0.446
Other Investment Advisor 0.486 0.500
Commodity Pool 0.424 0.494
Broker/Dealer 0.186 0.389
Insurance 0.065 0.247
Sponsor of LP 0.054 0.225
Trust 0.053 0.224
Bank or Thrift 0.045 0.208
Pension 0.036 0.187
Real Estate 0.027 0.163
Municipal Advisor 0.024 0.152
Accountant 0.023 0.150
Lawyer 0.015 0.123
Futures Merchant 0.014 0.119
Swap Dealer 0.011 0.103
Swap Participant 0.001 0.027
Share Supervised Persons 73%
Share Office 56%
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TABLE V Relationship between Inside Investment and Excess Return—Value-Weighted
This table shows the panel regression between the excess monthly return of an investment advi-
sor and percent investment from an insider or related party, skin. Column one regresses percent
inside investment against excess returns without additional controls. Column two adds additional
firm and year fixed effects. Column 3 and 4 repeat this exercise for a different measure of inside
investment—total gross inside investment in the firm. Specifications are repeated for the standard
four-factor model (Panel A) and Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor models (Panel B). All results are
value-weighted using Gross Asset Value from Form ADV.
Panel A: Fama-French Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FF)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0009)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0754∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0123)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log AUM No No Yes Yes
Observations 59,588 59,588 59,588 59,588
R2 0.0016 0.0728 0.0025 0.0728
Panel B: Fung-Hsieh Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FH)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0009)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0890∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0121)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log AUM No No Yes Yes
Observations 59,588 59,588 59,588 59,588
R2 0.0021 0.0805 0.0034 0.0805
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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TABLE VI Relationship between Inside Investment and Excess Return—Equal-Weighted
This table shows the panel regression between the excess monthly return of an investment advi-
sor and percent investment from an insider or related party, skin. Column one regresses percent
inside investment against excess returns without additional controls. Column two adds additional
firm and year fixed effects. Column 3 and 4 repeat this exercise for a different measure of inside
investment—total gross inside investment in the firm. Specifications are repeated for the standard
four-factor model (Panel A) and Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor models (Panel B). All results are
equal-weighted.
Panel A: Fama-French Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FF)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0007)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0143)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log AUM No No Yes Yes
Observations 59,588 59,588 59,588 59,588
R2 0.0002 0.0713 0.0007 0.0713
Panel B: Fung-Hsieh Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FH)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0007)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0133)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log AUM No No Yes Yes
Observations 59,588 59,588 59,588 59,588
R2 0.0002 0.0888 0.0008 0.0888
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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TABLE VII Flow Performance and Return Predictability
This table shows the panel regression of fund flow-performance and return predictability regres-
sions. In both cases, the key dependent variable is lagged return (excess of the Fama-French factors).
The independent variable in columns 1-2 is Fund Inflows, where flows are defined as: FLOWit =
AUMit−(1+ri,t)·AUMi,t−1
AUMi,t−1 . The specification in this regressions is: FLOWi,t→t+1 = β(1 + r
e
i,t−1→t) + εi,t.
Columns 3-4 are return predictability specifications, in which the independent variable is next pe-
riod excess return: rei,t→t+1 = βr
e
i,t−1→t + εi,t. Funds are divided by the average level of inside
investment into insider funds (> 20% Inside Investment) and outsider funds. All results are value-
weighted using the Gross Asset Value from Form ADV.
Dep. Var: Flow Current Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Excess Return −0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.059) (0.046)
Sample: Insider Outsider Insider Outsider
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217 450 217 450
R2 0.059 0.068 0.287 0.028
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
46
TABLE VIII Inside Investment and Fund Size
This table shows the panel regression between size and inside skin in the game. Panel A con-
ducts analysis on the matched sample connecting Form ADV with commercial hedge fund datasets
(where the key dependent variable is assets under management, taken from the commercial hedge
fund datasets, reported as the log of AUM or in millions). Panel B performs analysis on the com-
plete ADV dataset, using as the dependent variable Gross Asset Value. All specifications regress
the fraction of the fund which consists on insider investment against a measure of size, measured
yearly. Columns (1) and (3) across all specifications perform this regression with no additional
controls; columns (2) and (4) add firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Results on Matched Dataset
Dependent variable:
AUM (in $m) Log(AUM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pct Skin −37.50∗∗∗ −13.70∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(2.23) (1.00) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Dataset Matched Matched Matched Matched
Observations 3,700 3,223 3,700 3,223
R2 0.07 0.96 0.11 0.88
Panel B: Results on ADV Dataset
Dependent variable:
Gross Asset Value (in $m) Log(Gross Asset Value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pct Skin −49.17∗∗∗ −19.13∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(5.99) (2.29) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Dataset ADV ADV ADV ADV
Observations 51,006 51,006 51,006 51,006
R2 0.001 0.93 0.0002 0.76
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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TABLE IX Fund Flows and Performance
This table shows the panel regression between size and inside skin in the game. Panel A con-
ducts analysis on the matched sample connecting Form ADV with commercial hedge fund datasets
(where the key dependent variable is assets under management, taken from the commercial hedge
fund datasets, reported as the log of AUM or in millions). Panel B performs analysis on the com-
plete ADV dataset, using as the dependent variable Gross Asset Value. All specifications regress
the fraction of the fund which consists on insider investment against a measure of size, measured
yearly. Columns (1) and (3) across all specifications perform this regression with no additional
controls; columns (2) and (4) add firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Excess Return
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Insider Flow (%) 0.0003 −0.0000 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Lagged Outsider Flow (%) 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Year FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 936 936 936
R2 0.0035 0.2465 0.6035
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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TABLE X Firm-Level Equity Ownership and Returns
This table shows a panel regression with alternate measures of firm ownership. # of Equity Holders
captures the total number of beneficial owners listed in Form ADV for the firm’s equity. HHI of
Firm Equity captures a Herfindahl-Hirschman index measure of concentration of equity ownership.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Monthly Excess Return (FF)
(1) (2) (3)
Skin (Percent) 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
# of Equity Holders −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0170∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0032)
HHI of Firm Equity 0.0840∗∗ −0.0142
(0.0355) (0.0399)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Log(Size) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,978 63,978 63,978
R2 0.0142 0.0132 0.0143
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A Appendix: Model
To fix ideas, we outline a simple, rational, two period partial equilibrium model that
highlights how the internal capital allocation decisions of hedge fund managers interact
with measured performance. We model active portfolio managers as maximizing their
profits by selectively opening and allocating insider capital between a family of funds under
their control. Insiders rationally allocate internal capital across strategies to maximize total
profits.
Our simple model has several salient features that differ from previous works. First,
we disaggregate capital from insiders and outsiders. This captures the idea that insiders
compensation is tied to both management fees earned on outside capital and returns on
insider capital. We also model for endogenous fund generation in the form of multiple
investment strategies and managerial discretion to differentially allocate insider capital
across these strategies. For clarity, both in notation and results, we focus on a two period
model. Finally, costs in our model are convex in gross returns, as this helps match stylized
facts we observe in the data.
A.1 Capital: Insider and Outsider
There are two types of investors in this model: insiders and outsiders.
An insider is an investor with highly specialized arbitrage skills.9 This maps into prac-
tice to someone who has access to a positive alpha strategy (i.e., portfolio managers, hedge
fund employees, and closely related parties). An investor can invest either in their strategy,
the appropriate passive benchmark portfolio, or combination of both.
An outsider refers to anyone who is not an insider. They can be thought of as limited
partners who delegate their capital to manager through a fund. By definition, outsiders
do not posses such specialized skills. As such, outsiders can invest their capital in the
appropriate passive benchmark portfolio, delegate their capital to these insiders to access
investment strategies, or a combination of both.
9We take a similar view to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that arbitrage is typically carried out by a few,
highly specialized investors.
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Capital is denoted by q and any superscript notation denotes who supplies the capital.
Total capital, insider capital, and outsider capital are denoted by qT, qI and qO, respectively.
Total capital is defined as:
qT ≡ qI + qO (10)
We exclude the possibility of leverage and define total capital as. Further, we exclude the
possibility of short-selling, so qI , qO ≥ 0.10
A.2 Investment Technology
An active manager specializes in N strategies indexed by n. Each strategy has limited
investible capacity. The more capital invested in a strategy at time t, either from an insider
or outsider, results in a lower gross excess return. Formally, we define the gross return to
strategy n at time t + 1, for an investment of qn,t by:
Rn,t+1 = αn − Cn
(
qTn,t
)
(11)
The excess return is above an appropriate passive benchmark, which all investors are
assumed to have access to. The first term, αn, captures the maximum alpha to strategy
n and is by assumption positive (αn > 0). The second term is a cost function, Cn
(
qTn,t
)
,
which depends on the total capital invested at period t in strategy n. The cost function is
strictly non-negative (C ≥ 0), increasing and convex (C′ > 0, and C′′ > 0). Further, at no
investment, C(0) = 0, and in the limit, limqTt →∞ C
′(qTn,t) = ∞.11 The assumption of decreasing
returns to scale is motivated by research suggesting a negative relationship between size
and performance, such as Fung et al. (2008).
It is important to emphasize that different strategies have different αn and cost functions
Cn. For simplicity of this model and to make our analysis concrete, we assume a specific
functional form for this cost: Cn
(
qTn,t
)
= an2
(
qTn,t
)2. The scale cost is non-negative, an ≥ 0,
and captures how well the strategy scales.12 A smaller scale cost indicates that a strategy
10Including leverage subject to a collateral constraint does not affect our model results.
11This results in a decreasing returns to scale in the gross excess return and a departure from the Berk and
van Binsbergen (2017), where costs are linear in the return equation.
12Costs are orthogonal to risk factors and collinear with αn.
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scales better. An example of the tradeoff between strategies with different excess return
and scale is show in Figure A.1.
To simplify notation, we assume that capital is allocated at time t and suppress time
subscripts on all capital variables q. All returns are assumed to occur at t + 1, and time
subscripts are omitted for returns as well.
A.3 Baseline Model: One Strategy
We focus first on the case in which firms have only one strategy N = 1, and omit the
subscript indexing of strategies. We first identify the value add of managers, as discussed
in Berk and van Binsbergen (2015). The insider value add, V I , is defined as the profit from
investing in their own strategy in addition to fees collected on managed outsider capital.
We assume that the management fee f , is a fraction of outside capital invested, and take
these as given. Outsider value add is similar to the insider value add, but subtracting the
fees:13
V I = qI
(
R
(
qT
))
+ qO f (12)
VO = qO
(
R
(
qT
))
− qO f (13)
A.3.1 Case 1: Unconstrained Inside Capital
We first consider the case where insider capital is unconstrained. How much would an
insider invest in their own fund? Absent outside investors, the insiders’ objective can be
written as:
arg max
qI
V It+1 = q
I
t
(
α− C
(
qIt
))
With a solution:
q¯I∗t =
√
2α
3a
(14)
Notice that, q¯I∗ = qT, insider are sufficiently capitalized and refuse outside capital.
Substituting back into 12, the value add to insider, we get 2αq
I
3 , and corresponds to the
maximum achievable benefit from the strategy.
13More realistically, hedge fund fees also incorporate a performance fee on returns above a certain hurdle
rate, assuming the fund’s value exceeds a high water mark, as well as exit fees.
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A.3.2 Case 2: Fully Constrained Inside Capital
Next we consider the case where insider capital is fully constrained, and are unable
to pledge any of their capital to a strategy. How much much outsider capital would they
accept? Outsiders will continue to invest until the benefit from investing in the strategy is
equal to zero. The maximum qO is given by:
q¯O∗t =
√
2 (α− f )
a
(15)
Notice that the value add to ousiders is driven to zero and that insiders only earn from
management fees. Further, the insider earns only on through management fees.
A.3.3 Case 3: Constrained Inside Capital
We next consider the interior case where an insider has only one investment strategy
but is capital constrained. That is, qIt ∈
[
0, q¯I∗t
)
. How much outside capital should the
insider accept? The insiders choose the amount of outside capital to maximize the objective,
subject to the outsider capital providers’ participation constraint. These conditions are
given by:
arg max
qO
qI
(
α− C
(
qT
))
+ f qO (16)
VO = qO
(
α− C(qT)
)
− f qO ≥ 0 (17)
When qO > 0, and the insider collects a proportional and fixed management fee, f , for
their services. The model is solved by:
qO
∗
=

√
2(α− f )
a − qI i f α− f < f
2
2a(qI)2
f
aqI − qI i f
(
f
aqI − qI
)(
α− f − f 2
2a(qI)2
)
> 0
0 else
√
f
a < q
I
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The first region is the case where both insiders and outsider allocate to the the strategy.
Insiders are highly capital constrained, and outsiders can allocate capital up to the point
where their participation constraint is binding. As a result, the value add to outsiders is
equal to zero. In this region, insiders can increase their capital level, which would directly
replace the level of outsider capital.
The second region is the case where an insider can maximize their own value add by
limiting the level of outsider capital. Outsiders would prefer to contribute more capital
but this would not maximize the value add to insiders. As a result, the remaining outside
investors earn a positive value add from investing in the strategy.
The final region is the case where the outsider’s participation constraint is binding.
The insider has reduced the gross return of the strategy to the point where the marginal
benefit to an additional dollar from an outsider is less than the marginal cost of fees and
the capacity constraint. As a result, no outsider would contribute to this strategy. Notice
that there an insider may continue to contribute to this strategy, as they do not pay fees.
Proposition 1 There exists a positive fee where outsider value add equal zero for all levels of
investment.
Proof The optimization problem reduces to:
arg max
qO , f
qI
(
α− C
(
qT
))
+ f qO (18)
s.t. VO = qO
(
α− C(qT)
)
− f qO ≥ 0 (19)
With the solution corresponding to f = 23α. The insider will choose management fees, f ,
to capture the entire surplus from investing. As a result, outsiders participation constraint
will be binding.
Proposition 2 For a non-binding managmeent fee and positive level of outside investment, total
capital is weakly decreasing as a portion of insider capital.
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Proof Consider an investment strategy managed by an insider with a non-binding the fee,
0 < f < 23α, and a positive level of outside investment, q
O > 0. Outsider capital qT is
decreasing in the level of insdier investment. This can be seen directly:
dqO
∗
dqI
=

−1 i f α− f < f 2
2a(qI)2
− f
aqI2
− 1 i f
(
f
aqI − qI
)(
α− f − f 2
2a(qI)2
)
> 0
Proposition 3 Value add to insider is weakly increase as a fraction of insider investment
Proof Plugging in the optimal level of outsider capital qO
∗
into the value add to insider,
we get:
V I =

f
√
2(α− f )
a i f α− f < f
2
2a(qI)2
(α− f ) qI − f 2
2aqI2
+ f
√
2(α− f )
a i f
(
f
aqI − qI
)(
α− f − f 2
2a(qI)2
)
> 0
qI
(
α− a2qI
2
)
else
√
f
a < q¯
I∗
t
Taking the value add to insiders deriviative with respect to insider capital, we get:
dV I
dqI
=

0 i f α− f < f 2
2a(qI)2
(α− f ) + f 2
aqI3
i f
(
f
aqI − qI
)(
α− f − f 2
2a(qI)2
)
> 0
α− 3a2 qI
2
else
√
f
a < q¯
I∗
t
Proposition 4 For a non-binding managmeent fee and positive level of outside investment, gross
fees are weakly increasing as a portion of insider capital.
Proof This is immediate when subsitiuting the optimal level of outsider capital, qO
∗
, sub-
stituting into the gross return equation, and taking the first derivative with respect to qI .
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A.4 Extension: Two Strategies
Up to now we have considered the case of one strategy. We extend the analysis to an
insider which has access to two strategies, N = 2. Consider the insider with access to the
following returns:
R1 = α1 − C1
(
qT1
)
R2 = α2 − C2
(
qT2
)
Without loss of generality, assume that α1 > α2. The interesting case is if, a1 < a2. This
means that strategy one has a higher alpha, and also a lower higher scale cost as compared
to strategy two.
Capital between the two strategies and investors is given by qTn = qIn + qOn with n ∈ {1, 2}.
For insiders qI = qI1 + q
I
2, for outsiders q
O = qO1 + q
O
2 , and in aggregate q
T = qT1 + q
T
2 . Shorting
an insider’s management service is ruled out, so qIn ≥ 0 and qOn ≥ 0.
A.4.1 Case 1: Constrained Inside Capital, One Fund
The insider’s total value add is now the sum of value add from each strategy, V I1 + V
I
2 .
Given this, how should an insider allocate their capital between strategies? If so, should
the insider capital be allocated across strategies? Would an insider ever invest in the low
alpha strategy? If so, what rule would govern this?
We first consider the case when an insider capital is in the range of 0 < qI <
√
2α1
3a1
.
Intuitively, an insider would invest in the high alpha strategy up to the point where the
marginal value add equals the low alpha strategy. Said differently, the insider would invest
in strategy one for the initial range of qI where:
dV I1
dqI1
≥ dV
I
2
dqI2
(20)
While an the above inequality is satisfied, insiders maximize their value add by allo-
cating their capital to the high-alpha strategy. That means qI1 = q
I and qI2 = 0 for the initial
insider capital region. The value add for this partial regions is equal to V I1 , and is outlined
in the previous section.
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A.4.2 Case 2: Two Strategies, Sufficient Insider Capital, Two Funds
As an insider allocates capital towards strategy one, the marginal value of each ad-
ditional dollar will decrease towards the marginal value of strategy two. That is at some
point, dV
I
1
dqI1
= dV
I
2
dqI2
for some 0 < qˆI1 < q¯
I∗
1 . Once an insider’s capital level reaches the threshold
of qˆI1, they will optimally mix between their two strategies to equate their marginal values
to insider capital.
An insider will continue to allocate to both strategies, equating the marginal value add
from strategy 1 equal to the marginal value add from strategy 2. While we do not explicitly
solve the optimal mixing scheme in this paper, we can see a sketch of this strategy in Figure
A.2. An insider will continue to strategically allocate insider capital to both strategies for
insider capital levels of:
qI1 ∈
[
qˆI1,
√
2α1
3a1
+
√
2α2
3a2
)
If funds raise outside capital, they do so to maximize value added in each fund subject
to the fund-specific participation constraint.14
14We rule out the possibility that outside investors receive negative value add in some funds in order to
participate in others.
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FIGURE A.1 Gross Return Profiles of Different Strategies
The above figure shows two strategies. The horizontal axis is the total dollar invested qTt in a
given strategy, while the vertical axis is Rn,t+1. The red line refers to a high alpha, high scale costs,
while the blue dotted line refers to the low alpha, low scale cost strategy. The first strategy is
parameterized by α = 10%, and a = 4× 106, while the second is parameterized by α = 5%, and
a = 4× 107. The highest alpha, per strategy, is highest at a zero dollar investment.
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FIGURE A.2 Capital and Value Add
This figure illustrates the distributions of fund size and returns by fraction of inside investment.
Panel A illustrates that the total size of the fund is decreasing in the fraction of inside capital—the
fund operates at a smaller capital capacity the more insiders are invested. Panel B shows that net
returns to outsiders are higher the greater the proportion of inside investment. Parameters used in
this example is α = 10% and a = 4× 106.
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FIGURE A.3 Value Add to Insider and Components
This figure illustrates the value add to insiders and outsiders over the range of insider investment.
Outsiders have zero value add when insiders have no capital in the fund, or are fully invested.
They share in rents when insiders are partially invested in the fund, but also accept outside capital.
Parameters used in this example is α = 10% and a = 4× 106.
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Panel A: Percent of Inside Capital Allocated Across Funds
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FIGURE A.4 Percent Inside Allocation and Value Add of Two Strategies
This figure shows the optimal percent insider invested in each strategy across the total insider
capital. Parameters for the high alpha strategy is α = 10% and a = 4× 108. Parameters for the low
alpha, is α = 5% and a = 4× 107
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Appendix B: Model Details
Important Notation
Rn,t+1 Gross excess return over the relevant benchmark portfolio,
after accounting for scale effects of investing in strategy n.
αn Gross alpha for the first dollar invested in strategy n. This
is the maximum gross excess return over the relevant
benchmark. This is taken to be exogenous.
rn,t+1 Net return from strategy n.
qTn Total capital invested in strategy n. By definition,
qTn ≡ qIn + qOn .
qIn Insider capital invested in strategy n. This is taken to be
exogenous.
qOn Outsider capital invested in strategy n. This is taken to be
exogenous.
q¯I∗n The maximum amount of capital an insider choses to
invest in a strategy if unconstrained.
V In Value add to insiders from strategy n. This equals the
profit from returns and fees.
VO Value add to outsiders from strategy n. This equals the
profit from returns minus fees.
Cn
(
qT
)
Scale factor of investment strategy. For concreteness, we
use Cn
(
qT
)
= an2
(
qTn
)2 in this paper.
an Scale factor of strategy that is associated with strategy n.
This is taken to be exogenous.
fn Management fee that is a fraction of the assets delegated
by the outsider to the insider. This is set by the insider at
time t.
N Total number of strategies available to an investor.
n Referes to an individual strategy n. A strategy has a
unique αn, an, and thus Cn
(
qTn
)
.
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